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ABSTRACT
For over 100 years, the Clayton Act has ostensibly prohibited
anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions. Yet, as fears of market
concentration and market power grow, it seems high time for a boost
in enforcement. Armed with statutory causes of action for injunctive
relief and treble damages, private plaintiffs could provide that needed
boost. However, these plaintiffs face an unexpected hurdle to enforcing
the merger laws: section 2 of the Sherman Act.
This Note argues that the narrowing of liability under section 2 over
the past three decades has had a collateral impact on private
plaintiffs’—especially rival firms’—ability to satisfy the antitrust injury
requirement to challenge an anticompetitive merger. The 1986 Supreme
Court decision in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc. requires
plaintiffs to allege that newly merged firms will act anticompetitively in
a way that injures the plaintiffs. To make such allegations successfully,
plaintiffs must rely on accepted theories of antitrust liability, which will
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often sound in the predatory behaviors prohibited by section 2. But as
section 2 has shrunk, so too has the ability to challenge the merger.

INTRODUCTION
Disdain for market power has deep roots in American history. 1
Market power has a corrosive effect on society. It exacerbates
inequality 2 and makes society more exclusive. 3 And when taken too
far, market power even erodes democracy. 4 Alarmed by the degree of
market power wielded by monopolists in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, 5 Congress passed two landmark antitrust laws—
the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 6 and the Clayton Act of 1914. 7 The
Sherman Act has only two short sections, the second of which
(hereinafter, “section 2”) is devoted to preventing monopolistic
unilateral behavior. 8 Put differently, section 2 prohibits
anticompetitive behavior by a single firm. 9 In addition to the Sherman
Act’s general prohibitions on anticompetitive conduct, section 7 of the
Clayton Act specifically prohibits business combinations—mergers
and acquisitions—that “substantially lessen competition” or “tend to
1. Cf., e.g., FREDERIC M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 18 (3d ed. 1990) (arguing that “[l]imiting the power of both
government bodies and private individuals to make decisions that shape people’s lives was a
fundamental goal of the men who wrote the U.S. Constitution” and citing James Madison as an
example).
2. See Jason Furman & Peter Orszag, A Firm-Level Perspective on the Role of Rents in the
Rise in Inequality 2–3 (Oct. 16, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://gabrielzucman.eu/files/teaching/FurmanOrszag15.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4RBK-5C2F]
(explaining
different ways increased rents can impact inequality); see also Eric Posner & Glen Weyl, The Real
TIMES
(May
1,
2018),
Villain
Behind
Our
New
Gilded
Age,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/01/opinion/monopoly-power-new-gilded-age.html
[https://perma.cc/3M32-L2GJ] (“Market power both reduces growth and increases inequality.”).
3. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Is This Time Different? Capture and AntiCapture of U.S. Politics, 9 ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, no. 3, Mar. 2012, DOI: 10.1515/1553-3832.1902,
PDF at 2 (noting that monopoly “exclud[es] people from profitable economic opportunities”).
4. See Luigi Zingales, Towards a Political Theory of the Firm, 31 J. ECON. PERSP., Summer
2017, at 113, 113 (stating that large corporations have “enough money to capture . . . a majority
of the elected representatives”).
5. See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, WARREN S. GRIMES & CHRISTOPHER L. SAGERS, THE
LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 5 (3d ed. 2016) (“Chief among [the goals of
the Sherman Act] was to prevent the high prices associated with monopoly and cartel activity
. . . .”).
6. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
7. Clayton Act of 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15 U.S.C.).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
9. Id. § 1.
AND
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create a monopoly.” 10 Contemplating vigorous enforcement and
compensation to those injured by violations, the antitrust laws provide
a private right of action as part of their remedial scheme, allowing
injured firms to sue for both damages and injunctive relief. 11
In theory, mergers can benefit consumers by generating
efficiencies through economies of scale and vertical integration. 12 But
mergers also risk harming competition and consumers by giving firms
increased power in the marketplace to raise prices, control the inputs
of production, and stifle competitors. 13 The effect of mergers in the
U.S. has been, at best, a mixed bag, suggesting that the U.S. has gone
too far in its embrace of business combinations. 14 There is compelling
empirical evidence that frequent mergers have led to increased market
concentration—the degree to which a small number of firms control a
relevant market. And economic theory suggests that increased market
power accompanies higher levels of market concentration. 15
One recent study found that market concentration increased in 75
percent of industries in the U.S. over the last twenty years.16
Unsurprisingly, firm profitability increased in industries in which
market concentration increased, but only as a result of a firm’s ability
to “extract higher profit margins” through price markups, rather than
as a result of increased efficiency. 17 Another recent paper measured
the merger and acquisition (“M&A”) effects in U.S. manufacturing
industries and found an increase in price markups with “little
10.
11.
12.

Id. § 18.
Id. §§ 15(a), 26.
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 668–70 (5th ed. 2016) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP (5th ed. 2016)]
(explaining how the competitive dynamics of mergers have the potential to be both efficiencyenhancing and anticompetitive).
13. See id.
14. See Robert Pitofsky, Reinvigorating Merger Enforcement That Has Declined as a Result
of Conservative Economic Analysis, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE
EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 233, 233–34 (Robert
Pitofsky ed., 2008) [hereinafter CHICAGO SCHOOL] (summarizing Baker & Shapiro, infra note
35, as arguing that the antitrust enforcement in the U.S. had been inadequate).
15. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 3 (2010) (“Mergers that cause a significant increase in concentration and result in
highly concentrated markets are presumed to be likely to enhance market power . . . .”); see also
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS
PRACTICE 109–10 (1st ed. 1994) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP (1st ed. 1994)] (explaining how market
share can be used as a proxy for market power, all else equal).
16. Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin & Roni Michaely, Are U.S. Industries Becoming More
Concentrated?, REV. FIN. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 2), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2612047
[https://perma.cc/CKX3-WZN4].
17. Id. at 3.
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evidence” of “efficiency gains.” 18 Other analyses demonstrate similar
results. 19 Further, increased market concentration is not just bad for
consumers; it hurts workers as well. More concentrated industries carry
a lower labor share of output, 20 which is the part of “economic output
that accrues to workers as compensation in exchange for their labor.” 21
Against this empirical backdrop, it is critical to identify and
remove impediments to robust enforcement of the merger laws. In the
context of private suits, one barrier to effective enforcement is the
connection between the antitrust injury doctrine and section 2 of the
Sherman Act drawn by the Supreme Court in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort
of Colorado, Inc. 22 In addition to meeting the general requirements for
Article III standing, private plaintiffs must also satisfy a set of special,
prudential standing doctrines created by the Supreme Court,
collectively known as “antitrust standing.” 23 One such requirement is
that a plaintiff must demonstrate that they suffered an “antitrust
injury.” 24 An antitrust injury is an “injury of the type that the antitrust
laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes
defendants’ acts unlawful.” 25 That is, the plaintiff’s theory of injury
must derive directly from the anticompetitive characteristics of the
defendant’s conduct. 26
18. Bruce A. Blonigen & Justin R. Pierce, Evidence for the Effects of Mergers on Market
Power and Efficiency 5 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series Divs. of Research & Statistics & Monetary
Affairs
Fed.
Reserve
Bd.,
FEDS
Working
Paper
No.
2016-082,
2016),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2852716 [https://perma.cc/484T-VNFL].
19. See, e.g., Corporate Concentration: The Creep of Consolidation Across America’s
Corporate Landscape, ECONOMIST (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.economist.com/graphicdetail/2016/03/24/corporate-concentration [https://perma.cc/UJ33-8W6S] (noting increased
market concentration in the U.S.); Orley C. Ashenfelter, Daniel Hosken & Matthew C.
Weinberg, Did Robert Bork Understate the Competitive Impact of Mergers? Evidence from
Consummated Mergers 18 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19939, 2014),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2403663 [https://perma.cc/H4JB-74UL] (surveying forty-nine academic
studies that review merger effects and noting that thirty-six of them “find evidence of merger
induced price increases”).
20. Simcha Barkai, Declining Labor and Capital Shares 8 (2017) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation,
London
Business
School),
http://home.uchicago.edu/~barkai/doc/
BarkaiDecliningLaborCapital.pdf [https://perma.cc/WD64-EJCU].
21. Michael D. Giandrea & Shawn A. Sprague, Estimating the U.S. Labor Share, BUREAU
LAB. STAT. (Feb. 2017), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2017/article/estimating-the-us-laborshare.htm [https://perma.cc/6RKK-8V2F].
22. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
23. See HOVENKAMP (5th ed. 2016), supra note 12, at 812–13 (listing the three antitrust
standing requirements: (1) that the plaintiff suffered an injury, (2) that the injury is an “antitrust
injury,” and (3) “that [the] injur[y] w[as] caused by the antitrust violation”).
24. See infra Part II.
25. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
26. Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990).
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In Cargill, the Court established a narrow antitrust injury standard
for a competitor-plaintiff challenging a rival firm’s anticompetitive
merger. Instead of asking whether the merger itself reduced
competition in a way that might injure the plaintiff, the Court focused
its antitrust injury analysis on the hypothesized post-merger conduct of
the new entity, asking whether the new entity would itself act
anticompetitively. 27
By focusing the antitrust injury inquiry on the speculated conduct
of the merged entity, the Court effectively forced a plaintiff challenging
a merger to identify two antitrust violations in order to have standing.
First, the plaintiff must allege that the merger is anticompetitive; and
second, the plaintiff must allege that the new firm will act
anticompetitively in a way that injured or will injure the plaintiff. 28
Because the second theory of injury will turn on the conduct of the new
firm—a single entity—a competitor-plaintiff will often rely on section
2 of the Sherman Act. 29
However, in the thirty years since Cargill was decided, the Court
has significantly narrowed the scope of section 2 liability. Today, it is
very difficult for a firm to seek refuge in the antitrust laws against a
rival firm that is acting anticompetitively. 30 In three cases, 31 the Court
has cast doubt on a competitor-firm’s ability to seek redress in the
antitrust laws by all but eliminating a duty to deal with one’s rivals,
narrowing the definition of predatory pricing, and generally viewing
claims of monopolistic behavior skeptically. 32
By narrowing the scope of anticompetitive behavior under section
2, the Court has decreased plaintiffs’ ability to show that post-merger
firms will act anticompetitively. This has effectively cut out competitors
from the statutory right of action to challenge anticompetitive
mergers. 33 In light of this doctrinal narrowing, mounting evidence that
business combinations are frequently anticompetitive, and rising levels
of market concentration in the U.S., the Court should overturn the
Cargill decision.

27. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 114–15; see also infra Part II.A (discussing Cargill).
28. See infra text accompanying note 55; infra Part II.B.
29. See infra Part IV.
30. See infra Part III.
31. Pac. Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 442 (2008); Verizon
Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
32. See infra Part III.B.
33. See infra Part IV.
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This Note proceeds in five parts. Part I reviews the merger
enforcement landscape in the U.S., noting decreased levels of public
enforcement. Part II discusses the Cargill decision and antitrust injury
in the merger context. Part III reviews section 2 and examines the three
cases since Cargill that narrow antitrust liability, focusing in particular
on a competitor’s new inability to use section 2 to protect itself. Part
IV analyzes the interaction between section 2 and the antitrust injury
doctrine, discussing how the narrower scope of section 2 collaterally
impacts private merger challenges. Finally, Part V argues that the
Court should both overrule the Cargill decision and reexamine the
antitrust injury doctrine covering mergers.
I. THE MERGER ENFORCEMENT LANDSCAPE
With the rise in market concentration and its associated effects, it
is worth asking why the nation’s most powerful antitrust enforcers, the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission
(“FTC”), have not been more aggressive in enforcing the Clayton Act’s
prohibition against anticompetitive mergers. 34 Enforcement of the
merger laws by the FTC and DOJ has notably declined since the
Reagan administration. 35 This Note acknowledges the decline in
enforcement and suggests three potential explanations. First, antitrust
law is becoming increasingly international; the FTC and DOJ now have
the difficult job of policing international price cartels. 36 Second, general
resource constraints caution against bringing lawsuits where the
government might lose. Third and finally, merger challenges have been
treated more skeptically by the courts, a possible indication that
substantive merger law has changed. 37

34. See F.M. Scherer, Conservative Economics and Antitrust: A Variety of Influences, in
CHICAGO SCHOOL, supra note 14, at 30, 36 (noting the “significant backtracking in antitrust
precedents and enforcement”).
35. Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement, in
CHICAGO SCHOOL, supra note 14, at 235, 244–51; Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Evaluating
Merger Enforcement During the Obama Administration, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 28, 29–30
(2012).
36. JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL PRICE FIXING 419–24 (2d ed. 2007).
37. For examples of where the courts have been overly critical of merger challenges, see
Jonathan S. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Detecting and Reversing the Decline in Horizontal Merger
Enforcement, 22 ANTITRUST, no. 3, Summer 2008, at 29, 32 (first citing United States v. Syufy
Enters., 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990); and then citing United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp.
2d 1098, 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2004)). See also SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 467 (“[T]he law of
merger and acquisition has become much more permissive in the past few decades . . . .”).

2019]

COLLATERAL DAMAGE

127

In light of the Clayton Act’s strong statutory authorization for
private enforcement, 38 private merger lawsuits could be part of the
solution to addressing increased market concentration. And yet,
private challenges to mergers are infrequent. 39 The prevailing attitude
among practitioners is that private antitrust lawsuits represent only a
slight risk during merger negotiations. 40 Depending on the plaintiff’s
status as a market participant (competitor, consumer, etc.), the two
major concerns with private party enforcement are scope and
incentives. The language of the Clayton Act is quite broad, granting a
private right of action to “[a]ny person” 41 injured by an antitrust
violation. Accordingly, courts worry about overenforcement,
excessively complex litigation, and an endless number of potential
plaintiffs. 42 There is also a fear that competitors will abuse the antitrust
laws for selfish ends, 43 challenging mergers when they anticipate that
the merged entity will gain an efficiency advantage. 44

38. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 129 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(“Effective enforcement of the antitrust laws has always depended largely on the work of private
attorney generals, for whom Congress made special provision in the Clayton Act itself.”); see also
Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling Private Incentives and
Public Enforcement, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11 (1995) (“The antitrust statutes contain exceptionally
powerful private remedies, comparable in scope and effect to the remedies available under public
enforcement.”).
39. See HOVENKAMP (5th ed. 2016), supra note 12, at 671 (noting “the relatively small
number of merger cases brought by private plaintiffs”); see also EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN
GERADIN, GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 916 (2d ed. 2011) (“[P]rivate parties
rarely seek to challenge a merger that the agency has cleared.”); SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 5,
at 479 (“Neither the states nor private plaintiffs have ever been especially prominent in merger
enforcement . . . .”); Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Working Party No. 3 on Cooperation and Enforcement: Relationship Between Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement, at 6,
DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2015)11 (June 9, 2015), http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/
publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2015)11&docLanguage=En
[https://perma.cc/598E-T3DF] (“Private merger litigation is possible, but unusual.”).
40. Cf. M. Sean Royall & Adam J. Di Vincenzo, When Mergers Become a Private Matter: An
Updated Antitrust Primer, 26 ANTITRUST, no. 2, Spring 2012, at 41, 41 (observing that “antitrust
merger challenges launched by private parties . . . [are] infrequent and often unsuccessful”).
41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(a), 26 (2012).
42. Cf. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 739–41 (1977) (describing joinder of all the
potential lawsuits as “impractical” in a case that limited enforcement of the antitrust laws to
indirect purchasers).
43. See Brodley, supra note 38, at 48 (“Some commentators have joined the negative chorus,
asserting that competitors in antitrust cases are almost always wrongly motivated.”).
44. Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Cargill Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) (No. 85-473),
1986 WL 727374, at *9–12.
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Although consumers are the ideal plaintiffs to bring suits
challenging anticompetitive mergers, 45 the stark reality is that their
individual interests are simply too small to warrant litigation.46
Moreover, consumers are often concerned with short-term price
decreases, whereas the price increase following a merger may occur
only over a longer time horizon. 47 Thus, rival firms are better situated
than consumers to challenge mergers as private plaintiffs—holding a
competitive stake in a specific market makes them more attentive to
the impact of a merger. 48
Fears about competitors as plaintiffs are overblown for several
reasons. First, because horizontal mergers increase concentration and
thus the potential for collusion, 49 a competitor challenging a horizontal
merger between rivals might fear retaliation for refusal to participate
in the collusive behavior. 50 Additionally, competitors might also
reasonably fear that a vertical merger will exclude them from vital
upstream inputs or downstream markets, perhaps eventually forcing
them out of business. 51 Given the narrowing of section 2 liability, 52 such
fears are not without merit. Because rival firms possess the financial
incentives and industry knowledge to mount viable challenges to
anticompetitive mergers, 53 and because private enforcement is part of
the antitrust laws’ remedial scheme, obstacles should be cleared away.
One of these obstacles, discussed below, is the antitrust injury
framework laid out in the Supreme Court’s decision in Cargill. In
tandem with the Court’s increasingly narrow interpretation of section
2, the Cargill decision hinders private enforcement by making it
difficult to satisfy antitrust standing requirements.

45. Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Arbitration and Illinois Brick, 100
IOWA L. REV. 2115, 2117 (2015) (“Consumers, by contrast, are, in some sense, the perfect antitrust
plaintiffs. They are the intended beneficiaries of the competitive markets that antitrust policy
seeks to encourage . . . .”).
46. See Brodley, supra note 38, at 36–37 (describing how consumers lack both the sufficient
monetary incentive to justify litigation and the understanding of the industry to pursue litigation).
47. Id.
48. See id. at 47 (“As compared with other business litigants, competitors are generally the
best-placed firms to pursue merger litigation.”).
49. See Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21
STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1603 (1969) (“Collusion is more difficult in a market that has a large number
of sellers than in one with relatively few . . . .”).
50. Brodley, supra note 38, at 49.
51. See infra Part IV.
52. See infra Part III.
53. See Brodley, supra note 38, at 50 (providing extensive analysis of the capabilities,
incentives, and considerations of competitors as plaintiffs to challenge mergers).
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II. A FAILED APPROACH TO MERGER ANTIRUST INJURY
Private antitrust plaintiffs must show an antitrust injury—one
derived directly from the anticompetitive aspects of the defendant’s
conduct. 54 When a competitor-plaintiff challenges a merger involving
its rival, the Court has held that the question of antitrust injury is not
whether the merger is anticompetitive, but rather whether the postmerger firm will behave in a way that is anticompetitive. As a result,
the plaintiff must essentially allege two antitrust violations: (1) the
anticompetitive merger and (2) speculated anticompetitive conduct of
the new firm. 55 Frequently, this second theory will be brought under
section 2 of the Sherman Act, 56 which prohibits anticompetitive
unilateral conduct by making it illegal to “monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States.” 57 Using section 2 makes sense, given that the plaintiff, who has
to consider how the new, merged firm will act, will rely on theories of
anticompetitive behavior that involve a single firm.
A. The Creation of Antitrust Injury for Mergers
The genesis of the Court’s antitrust injury doctrine involved a
challenge to an acquisition. In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc., 58 the plaintiffs, operators of bowling alleys, sued for damages for
lost income when the defendant, the nation’s largest bowling alley
operator, acquired failing bowling alleys within the plaintiff’s market.59
Rather than close the beleaguered alleys, the defendant kept them
open, depriving the plaintiffs of the increased profits and market power
they would have enjoyed had the alleys been shuttered. 60 In deciding
the case, the Court reasoned that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to
protect competition. And by saving the failing bowling alleys, the
acquisition actually preserved competition by maintaining the number
of market participants. Thus, the plaintiffs did not suffer an injury for
which the antitrust laws would provide relief. 61 The Court held that, in

54. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
55. See infra Part II.B.
56. See HOVENKAMP (5th ed. 2016), supra note 12, at 671 (“Nevertheless, in the relatively
small number of merger cases brought by plaintiffs, the underlying rationale is most often
exclusionary practices such as predatory pricing.” (citation omitted)).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
58. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
59. Id. at 479.
60. Id. at 481.
61. Id. at 488.
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order to bring a valid claim, a plaintiff must show an injury “of the type
the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that
which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.” 62
In 1986, the Court, in a seminal moment, extended the antitrust
injury doctrine to injunctive lawsuits challenging mergers in Cargill,
Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc. 63 The nation’s fifth largest beef
packer, Monfort, sued to enjoin a merger between the second and third
largest beef packers. 64 The Court began its analysis by comparing the
difference in language between sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act. 65
On one hand, section 4 sets out the private right of action for damages
under the antitrust laws and requires a plaintiff to allege an actual
injury to “business or property.” 66 On the other hand, section 16
provides the right of action for an injunctive suit, which requires only
a “threatened” injury. 67 The Court held that both provisions require
the showing of an injury or threatened “injury of the type the antitrust
laws were designed to prevent.” 68
The Court then rejected both of Monfort’s alleged threatened
antitrust injuries that would result from the merger. 69 As for the first
theory, Monfort argued that the merger would increase the efficiency
of the merged firm, thus enabling it to lower prices and gain additional
market share. 70 In turn, Monfort would have to lower its own prices
and, therefore, would suffer an injury in the form of lost profits. 71 The
Court rejected this theory. Relying on Brunswick, the Court stated that
this argument amounted to a complaint of increased price
competition—a type of business behavior the antitrust laws were
enacted to preserve. 72
Monfort’s second theory was that the merged firm would engage
in predatory pricing—valuing goods below cost in order to drive its

62. Id. at 489.
63. Cargill Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 106–07 (1986); see also Brodley, supra
note 38, at 5 (“The Cargill decision is notable . . . because the Court applied the antitrust injury
doctrine to a merger injunction action.”).
64. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 106–07.
65. Id. at 110–11 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (2012)).
66. Id. at 111 (citing 15 U.S.C § 15(a)).
67. Id.
68. Id. (citation omitted).
69. Id. at 114.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 115.
72. Id. at 115 (citing Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977)).
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competitors out of business. 73 The Court found that the allegation of
predatory pricing was a viable theory of antitrust injury but ultimately
rejected the plaintiff’s claim because it had not properly alleged a
credible threat of predatory pricing and therefore did not have
standing. 74
In a dissent joined by Justice White, Justice Stevens criticized the
majority for what he perceived as an ill-advised approach to antitrust
injury for injunctive suits challenging mergers. 75 Specifically, the
dissent criticized the Court for focusing entirely on the alleged postmerger behavior of the new, merged entity instead of the more
proximate question of whether the merger itself would damage
competition. 76 In Stevens’s view, “[w]hen the proof discloses a
reasonable probability that competition will be harmed as a result of a
merger, [the Court should] also conclude that there is a reasonable
probability that a competitor of the merging firms will suffer some
corresponding harm in due course.” 77
The dissent distinguished Brunswick in several ways. First,
Brunswick dealt with a damages claim under a separate section of the
Clayton Act where the plaintiff must prove an actual injury. 78 Second,
and more critically, the facts of the merger were completely different.
Brunswick involved an acquisition that buoyed competition by keeping
suppliers open, thereby denying the plaintiffs the market power that
they would have accrued absent the merger. 79 In Cargill, by contrast,
the merger reduced the number of market participants and therefore
reduced competition. The dissent also focused closely on the specific
language and legislative history of sections 7 and 16 of the Clayton Act,
which revealed Congress’s intent to provide a broad scope of injunctive
relief. 80 The dissent concluded by observing that Congress’s intent to
have vigorous private enforcement was reaffirmed just ten years before
Cargill, when Congress authorized recovery of plaintiff’s attorney’s
fees. 81 Taken as a whole, the dissent expressed confidence that
73. Id. at 117. Predatory Pricing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining
“predatory pricing” as “pricing below an appropriate measure of cost for the purpose of
eliminating competitors in the short run and reducing competition in the long run”).
74. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 119.
75. Id. at 122–29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 122–23.
77. Id. at 128–29.
78. Id. at 128.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 125–26.
81. Id. at 129.
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Congress wanted anticompetitive mergers enjoined, and that the Court
had no business erecting additional barriers obstructing that goal. 82
B. The Trouble with Antitrust Injury in Merger Suits
The Court’s decision in Cargill largely divorces the question of
antitrust injury from the existence of an illegal merger. A merger might
“substantially lessen competition” or “tend to create a monopoly” and,
therefore, be illegal. 83 Yet Cargill only permits private plaintiffs to
challenge the illegal merger if they can sufficiently allege that the postmerger firm will act in an anticompetitive way that injures them. 84 The
Court has consistently maintained this antitrust injury approach in
other areas of antitrust law; even if there is an antitrust violation, and
even if the plaintiff is injured indirectly by the violation, the plaintiff
will not have standing unless the injuries flow directly from the
characteristics of the violation that make it illegal. 85 The reasons for
this doctrine are understandable—it helps align private remedies with
the underlying goals of antitrust 86 and ensures that antitrust laws are
not being used, as in Brunswick, to compensate businesses for losses
resulting from competition. 87
The particular problem with the antitrust injury framework, in the
merger context, is that it effectively asks the plaintiff to allege two
separate antitrust violations by the defendant. A plaintiff must allege
not only that the merger is anticompetitive, but also that the merged
entity is likely to violate antitrust laws in a way that harms the plaintiff.
The Court in Cargill may not explicitly have held that the plaintiff
needed to identify by name an antitrust violation that the merged entity
would commit; however, the practical effect of the decision is to force
82. Id. at 122–29.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
84. See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 115–19 (explaining that the competitor-plaintiff did not allege an
antitrust injury sufficient to challenge an anticompetitive practice because it did not sufficiently
allege a credible claim of future predatory pricing by the merged firm).
85. For cases analyzing the antitrust injury in, for example, price-fixing schemes, see Atlantic
Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 339 (1990) (holding that even though the
defendant’s conduct violated substantive antitrust law as an illegal price-fixing scheme, the
competitor-plaintiff did not suffer an antitrust injury because the plaintiff’s injuries did not flow
from the anticompetitive aspects of the defendant’s conduct); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.,
Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (explaining that even if there was a conspiracy
to fix prices between Japanese television manufacturers, plaintiffs, who were American television
manufacturers, would not have suffered an antitrust injury because they would have benefitted
from the conspiracy).
86. John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Who Suffered Antitrust Injury in the Microsoft
Case?, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829, 832 (2001).
87. Id.
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courts to compare the alleged post-merger conduct against theories of
Sherman Act violations. 88 Indeed, the lower courts, when analyzing
competitor standing in merger lawsuits, compare alleged post-merger
conduct against recognized antitrust violations. 89
This subsequent violation can be alleged under a collusive or
unilateral theory in violation of sections 1 or 2, respectively. 90 But in
either case, the ability to challenge the merger’s competitiveness
depends on the scope of liability for the subsequent antitrust
violation. 91 And for section 2, the scope of liability has been
dramatically narrowed.
III. IN THE SHADOW OF CARGILL: A CHANGE IN SECTION 2
JURISPRUDENCE
Prior to the late 1980s, the Court embraced a broader theory of
how firms can run afoul of section 2. In the years following Cargill,
however, the Court has tightened liability for monopolistic conduct
under section 2. In three particular cases, the Court has cast a shadow
of skepticism over a competitor-firm’s ability to seek refuge under the
antitrust laws for highly aggressive conduct by its rival.
A. Robust Section 2 Liability in the Pre-Cargill Era
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits anticompetitive unilateral
conduct by making it illegal to “monopolize, or attempt to monopolize

88. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 122–23 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the Court’s approach as
“deny[ing] relief unless the plaintiff can prove a violation of the Sherman Act”).
89. See, e.g., Pool Water Prods. v. Olin Corp., 258 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (denying
standing to a competitor suing for damages after a merger because the plaintiffs could not show
that the below-cost prices charged met the standard for predatory pricing); R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v.
Unilever N.V., 867 F.2d 102, 111 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that a competitor had standing to enjoin
a merger where it was alleged that the merged firm would have monopoly power and would
eliminate competition by foreclosing downstream channels to the plaintiff); Phototron Corp. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 842 F.2d 95, 100–01 (5th Cir. 1988) (denying standing because the plaintiffs
had only alleged that the merged firm would sell below cost, not that it would act predatorily);
Novation Ventures, LLC v. J.G. Wentworth Co., LLC, 156 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1102 (C.D. Cal. 2015)
(denying standing because plaintiff did not adequately plead facts that the merged entity
foreclosed the plaintiff from competing in the market); Sprint Nextel Corp. v. AT&T Inc., 821 F.
Supp. 2d 308, 320 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding the plaintiffs had standing to enjoin a merger after
alleging that the merged firm’s monopsony power would allow it to foreclose the market to
inputs).
90. See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 39, at 12 (explaining that section 1 of the Sherman
Act addresses anticompetitive and collusive agreements between market participants while
section 2 of the Sherman Act addresses anticompetitive conduct by a single firm).
91. See infra Part IV.
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. . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several States.” 92
Monopolization has been interpreted to require that a firm have
“monopoly power in the relevant market” and engage in some conduct
that is considered anticompetitive. 93 These two elements, power and
conduct, present challenges. The market power element is difficult
because it is not always clear what constitutes the relevant market.94
Once the market is defined, though, both economic theory 95 and
evidence 96 strongly suggest that market power is more likely to exist in
highly concentrated markets. The conduct element has also been
particularly perplexing for courts because it is often difficult to
distinguish between normal competitive business practices—which are
encouraged in a free market system—and anticompetitive ones. 97
Because distinguishing between normal business competition and
anticompetitive practices is challenging, many of the Court’s section 2
cases have involved attempts by firms to exclude rivals from the
market. 98 Until recently, the Court used a broader interpretation of
section 2 liability in these cases. 99 Indeed, Cargill was decided just one
year after Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 100 which
represented this more robust interpretation. 101
The suit at issue involved four ski mountains in Colorado. 102 The
defendant owned three of the four mountains, having acquired one
92. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
93. ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 39, at 265.
94. See, e.g., United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394 (1956)
(analyzing whether the relevant market was defined as cellophane or more broadly as “flexible
packaging materials”).
95. See, e.g., supra note 15 and accompanying text; HOVENKAMP (5th ed. 2016), supra note
12, at 109–10 (explaining how market share can be used as a proxy for market power, all else
equal); ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 39 at 997–1002 (defining how horizontal mergers can
allow a firm to exercise market power).
96. See supra notes 16–21 and accompanying text (reviewing empirical studies that
demonstrate market power exists in concentrated markets).
97. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 9 (2008) (“Competitive and exclusionary conduct can
look alike . . . making it hard to distinguish conduct that should be deemed unlawful from conduct
that should not.”).
98. ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 39, at 345.
99. See Robert Pitofsky, Chicago School and Dominant Firm Behavior, in CHICAGO
SCHOOL, supra note 14, at 107 (“One of the most remarkable developments in recent years is
hostility to section 2 enforcement by conservative scholars and in language in judicial decisions.”).
100. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
101. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409–10
(2004) (describing Aspen Skiing as “at or near the outer boundary of § 2 liability” and as a “limited
exception” where liability can be imposed for refusal to deal with competitors).
102. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 587–90.
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from a separate company, 103 while the plaintiff owned the fourth. 104 The
two companies originally coordinated to create an “all-Aspen ticket”
that gave guests a convenient way to ski all four mountains, allocating
revenues between the companies accordingly. 105 The option was widely
popular among consumers. 106 After taking a series of steps to reduce
cooperation, however, the defendant eventually discontinued
participation in the “all-Aspen Ticket” altogether. 107 The plaintiff’s
revenues declined sharply as a result of not being able to offer its guests
convenient access to all four mountains. 108
The Court affirmed a jury verdict finding the defendant liable for
illegal monopolization under section 2. 109 In reaching its decision, the
Court used a deferential standard of review and was keen to not disturb
the jury’s conclusions. 110 Routinely referring to the defendant as “the
monopolist,” the Court admonished business strategies that were not
based on either improving goods or lowering costs. 111 The Court
ultimately found it critical that the defendant offered no legitimate
business decision for the refusal to deal except for the “perceived
[negative] long-run impact on its smaller rival.” 112
At the time Cargill was decided, the Court may have understood
Aspen Skiing—then a fresh decision—as preserving a broad scope
conception of section 2 liability. Instead, Aspen Skiing was a high-water
mark.
B. Strangling Section 2
Since Aspen Skiing and Cargill, the Court has issued a series of
decisions that greatly narrow liability under section 2. Because the
Court takes so few antitrust cases, each case casts a wide shadow and

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 591 (“By 1977, multiarea tickets accounted for nearly 35% of the total
market.”).
107. Id. at 593–94.
108. Id. at 594–95.
109. Id. at 611.
110. Id. at 604–05.
111. See id. at 605 (“If a firm has been ‘attempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than
efficiency,’ it is fair to characterize its behavior as predatory.”); see also id. at 596 (quoting the
trial court’s instructions to the jury to distinguish “between practices which tend to exclude or
restrict competition on the one hand, and the success of a business which reflects only a superior
product, a well-run business, or luck, on the other” (citation omitted)).
112. Id. at 611–12.
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holds outsized influence. 113 Thus, in just three cases, the Court has
dramatically limited the scope of liability under section 2. In Brooke
Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 114 the Court made
predatory pricing harder to prove. In Verizon Communications Inc. v.
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 115 the Court confined Aspen
Skiing to its facts and spoke strongly of the virtues of unbridled
competition with little regard for the traditional worries of monopoly
power. And finally, in Pacific Bell Telephone Company v. Linkline
Communications, Inc., 116 the Court employed formalist reasoning to
reject price-squeezing as an antitrust violation. These decisions, taken
together, greatly narrow the scope of liability under section 2.
In Brooke Group, the Court affirmed a decision to set aside a jury
verdict that found liability for predatory pricing during price wars in
the tobacco industry. 117 Predatory pricing can be measured using
different metrics, 118 but, at its core, predatory pricing occurs when a
firm prices below its costs in order to force a rival out of business. By
lowering prices in the short term, the firm will be able to raise prices in
the long run with less competition. 119 Because the predatory firm must
forgo some short-term profits—and take on the risk that the scheme
will fail—the Court has come to believe that “predatory pricing
schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.” 120
Furthermore, courts have been extremely hesitant to find liability for
predatory pricing as lower prices are beneficial to consumers and often
result from vigorous price competition. 121 The Brooke Group Court
continued to enforce the rule that a plaintiff must show that the
113. See R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t Justice,
Antitrust Law in the U.S. Supreme Court, Address at British Institute of International and
Comparative Law Conference (May 11, 2004), https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/antitrust-lawus-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/GYZ5-5L7H] (“Because there are so few Supreme Court
antitrust decisions each year . . . and because each one sets precedent that will govern the
application of the antitrust laws in the lower courts for decades to come each decision is an event
of major significance for antitrust enforcers and the antitrust bar.”).
114. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
115. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
116. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2008).
117. Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 212.
118. Compare id. at 222 & n.1 (using average variable cost as the measure for predatory
pricing), with Commission Decision 2001/354/EC of 20 March 2001, 2001 O.J. (L 125) 1 (using
long-run incremental cost as a measure for predatory pricing).
119. See text accompanying supra note 73 (defining predatory pricing).
120. Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 226 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986)).
121. See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 39, at 353 (noting that “competitive price-cutting
is among the most desirable business activities”).
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defendant set prices below its variable cost, 122 but the Court added a
more onerous requirement that the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant firm have a “dangerous probability” of recouping its lost
short-term profits. 123
One commentator has called the belief that predatory pricing is
rarely attempted as “contrary to fact” 124 and indicated that data shows
“selective price predation is a recurring phenomenon . . . used
effectively to eliminate young rivals and to deter potential entry into
noncompetitive markets.” 125 Moreover, the Court in Brooke Group
ignored the fact that a dominant firm can still operate profitably during
a predatory pricing scheme because its scale allows it to produce at
lower costs than a market entrant. 126 The dominant firm can price
below its young competitor’s costs, but still above its own, and thereby
force its rival out of business while still operating profitably. 127
In addition to erecting the “dangerous probability” standard, the
Court’s willingness to affirm the district court’s decision to throw out a
jury’s finding of predatory pricing after a 115-day trial is striking.128
Such a move raises a serious question of exactly how much evidence
will be needed to make out a predatory pricing claim. Indeed, in
dissent, Justice Stevens took the majority to task for rejecting so much
evidence, arguing that the majority’s “conclusion rest[ed] on a
hodgepodge of legal, factual, and economic propositions that are
insufficient, alone or together, to overcome the jury’s assessment of the
evidence.” 129
The Court further narrowed section 2 in Verizon Communications
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP. 130 As part of their
statutory obligations under the 1996 Telecommunications Act,
incumbent local exchange carriers (“LECs”) were obliged to allow
competitors to access their local networks, 131 with these obligations
regulated and monitored by the Federal Communications Commission
(“FCC”) and state regulators. 132 The plaintiff, a customer in the local
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 222 & n.1.
Id. at 224.
Eleanor M. Fox, The Efficiency Paradox, in CHICAGO SCHOOL, supra note 14, at 82.
Id.
ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 39, at 383.
Id.
Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 243; id. at 254 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 254 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
Id. at 401–02.
Id. at 403–05.
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New York City market, alleged that Verizon was failing to meet its
statutory obligation to provide rivals local access and doing so “on a
discriminatory basis as part of an anticompetitive scheme to discourage
customers from becoming or remaining customers of competitive
LECs.” 133 The basis for the antitrust claim was a theory of liability
under section 2 for an illegal refusal to deal. 134
In finding no liability under section 2, the Court went to great
lengths to narrowly confine the precedential value of Aspen Skiing. 135
Declaring that “Aspen Skiing is at or near the outer boundary of § 2
liability,” the Court distinguished Aspen Skiing by highlighting that the
defendant ski company passed up on short-term profits, had a prior
course of dealing with its rival, and was denying its rival a product that
it already provided to customers at the retail level. 136 The Court seized
on these criteria to label Aspen Skiing as a “limited exception.” 137
A final case that narrows section 2 liability, and makes Trinko’s
impact very clear, is Pacific Bell Telephone Company v. Linkline
Communications, Inc. 138 In Linkline, the Court held that Trinko
forecloses a “price-squeeze” theory of liability, absent a duty to deal
with the competitor. 139 A price squeeze occurs when a firm with market
power sells necessary component goods to a rival and also competes
with that rival in a downstream market. 140 The firm with market power
can “squeeze” the margins of its competitor by raising component
prices while simultaneously lowering prices on the downstream
product. 141
In Linkline, plaintiffs were independent internet service providers
(“ISPs”) that competed with AT&T in the retail internet market in
California. 142 The ISPs did not own all of the requisite infrastructure to
provide internet to their customers and, therefore, leased a necessary
upstream component from AT&T. 143 Plaintiffs alleged that AT&T

133. Id. at 404.
134. Id. at 409.
135. Id. at 408–11.
136. Id. at 409–10.
137. Id. at 409. The Court also used the “already-providing-the-service-to-other-customers”
logic to distinguish Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372–74 (1973), an earlier
case that indicated a duty to deal with competitors under certain circumstances. Id. at 410.
138. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009).
139. Id. at 449–51.
140. ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 39, at 476.
141. Id.
142. Linkline, 555 U.S. at 442–43.
143. Id. at 443.
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raised prices on the input component while simultaneously lowering
prices for its retail internet prices. 144 This had the effect of “squeezing”
the ISPs’ profits because they were forced to lower their own retail
internet prices while paying more for the input service. 145 The Court
treated Trinko as dispositive and held that, absent a duty to deal, a
price squeeze is not an acceptable theory of liability under section 2. 146
According to the Court, if there is no duty to deal under Trinko, then
there accordingly was no “duty to deal under terms and conditions that
the rivals find commercially advantageous.” 147
The significance of these three cases is not necessarily in their
specific dispositions. Modern antitrust law is a highly fact-specific,
contextual discipline in which the particular industry, market structure,
market concentration, barriers to entry, and product are all relevant. 148
The impact of these opinions comes from the language employed by
the Court to describe section 2 as exceptionally permissive of
aggressive unilateral behavior. 149 Both Trinko and Linkline spoke in
sweeping terms of a firm’s freedom to deal, even if at great costs to
competitors. Of Trinko, for example, one commentator noted that
“[n]owhere in [the Court’s] opinion is there an expression of concern
about the traditional evils of dominance or monopoly power.” 150 This
language has influenced lower courts’ application of section 2. 151 As

144. Id. at 443–44.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 449.
147. Id. at 449–50.
148. See, e.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 186, 191 (2010)
(embracing a functionalist approach to determining when there is a single entity); Leegin Creative
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 879, 881–82 (2007) (overruling a nearly 100-year
precedent in favor of applying the rule of reason, which is a balancing test for determining
“whether a practice restrains trade” in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, to price
maintenance agreements); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 4, 24–25
(1979) (applying the rule of reason to certain price agreements among competitors); see also Carl
Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77
ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 49–60 (2010) (applauding the 2010 merger guidelines’ embrace of the various
complexities of specific markets).
149. See Harvey J. Goldschmid, Comment on Herbert Hovenkamp and the Dominant Firm:
The Chicago School Has Made Us Too Cautious About False Positives and the Use of Section 2 of
the Sherman Act, in CHICAGO SCHOOL, supra note 14, at 125 (expressing concerns that the
Court’s language “seriously undermines the traditional policy underpinnings of section 2”).
150. Id.
151. See, e.g., In re Adderall XR Antitrust Litig., 754 F.3d 128, 134–36 (2d Cir. 2014), as
corrected, (June 19, 2014) (relying heavily on Trinko and describing Aspen Skiing as a “narrow
exception”); Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1072–74 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing
Linkline and Trinko for the proposition that purely unilateral conduct has a strong presumption
of legality and that there is a “general rule protecting unilateral conduct”).
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discussed above, Brooke Group was significant because the Court was
willing to look past a jury verdict supported by an extensive record. 152
Taken together, these decisions send a strong message to lower courts
to be extremely skeptical of section 2 claims.
Several beliefs animate these three decisions. Permeating each is
a view that vigorous competition between rivals benefits consumers,
along with a corresponding fear that imposing liability for aggressive
unilateral conduct will result in false-positives. In the predatory-pricing
context, the overriding concern is chilling aggressive price competition,
which benefits consumers and is a cornerstone of the market system. 153
In the refusal-to-deal context, courts worry that forcing a firm to share
with its rivals will discourage investment in “economically beneficial”
assets or, perversely, “facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust:
collusion.” 154 Moreover, there are also concerns about judicial
administrability of liability rules in the antitrust context.155
These section 2 cases dramatically narrow the scope of liability for
unilateral conduct, especially when it comes to challenges by
competitors. Because of serious and legitimate concerns about
discouraging vigorous competition between rivals, competitors have
few viable avenues to allege a section 2 claim. But perhaps unintended
by the Court is the corresponding impact these decisions have had on
a rival firm’s ability to challenge anticompetitive mergers.
IV. ANTITRUST INJURY AS INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED WITH
SECTION 2
The narrowing of section 2 has had collateral consequences for
enforcement of the merger laws. Cargill forces merger challengers to
speculate on and allege a theory of anticompetitive conduct by the
combined firm. 156 And the theories of anticompetitive behaviors most
used by merger challengers to make this showing are theories under

152. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
153. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993)
(“[T]he mechanism by which a firm engages in predatory pricing—lowering prices—is the same
mechanism by which a firm stimulates competition; . . . mistaken inferences . . . are especially
costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.” (alteration
and second omission in original) (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., 479 U.S. 104, 122 n.17
(1986))).
154. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407–08
(2004).
155. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 452–55 (2009); Trinko, 540
U.S. at 411–13.
156. See supra Part II.
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section 2. 157 Recall, the Court in Cargill accepted predatory pricing as
a viable theory of antitrust injury. 158 In the wake of Brooke Group,
however, it is difficult to see how a plaintiff can make out a successful
claim under a predatory-pricing theory. 159 Indeed, Brooke Group’s
skepticism of predatory-pricing claims has impacted the lower courts’
standing analysis. 160
The effect of section 2’s narrowing is especially pronounced and
potentially damaging in the context of a competitor’s ability to
challenge an anticompetitive vertical acquisition. This is driven by the
elimination of liability under a theory of a unilateral refusal to deal.
Before Trinko, the prevailing view was that there were circumstances
where a refusal to deal with a rival was grounds for a section 2 claim. 161
Even if those situations were generally limited, the language and
impact of Trinko nonetheless makes clear that these exceptions are
extremely narrow and, in all likelihood, need to all but replicate the
facts of Aspen Skiing. 162 As it stands now, a rival can acquire necessary
upstream inputs or downstream revenue sources with the specific
intention of choking off its rival. If the rival wants to challenge the
vertical acquisition before it occurs, or recover damages after the fact,
it must allege both that the merger itself is illegal and that the rival will
suffer an antitrust injury as a result of the defendant’s post-acquisition
157. See HOVENKAMP (5th ed. 2016), supra note 12, at 671 (“Nevertheless, in the relatively
small number of merger cases brought by private plaintiffs, the underlying rationale is most often
exclusionary practices such as predatory pricing.”).
158. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 118 (1986) (“Predatory pricing is thus
a practice . . . capable of inflicting antitrust injury.”).
159. See Sandeep Vaheesan, Reconsidering Brooke Group: Predatory Pricing in Light of the
Empirical Learning, 12 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 81, 96 (2015) (“The Court has formulated a
predatory pricing test that has made it virtually impossible for plaintiffs to bring successful
claims.”).
160. See, e.g., Pool Water Prods. v. Olin Corp., 258 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (refusing
to find standing for aggressive pricing because “[a]bsent proof of predation, it is immaterial
whether the price reduction is the result of illegal price setting, illegal mergers and acquisitions,
collusion, price discrimination or any other antitrust violation. . . . ‘[S]o long as they are above
predatory levels, they do not threaten competition’” (quoting Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 233 (1993))).
161. See Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253, 261
(2003) (writing in 2003 that “every federal circuit court has interpreted this general
monopolization standard to impose an antitrust duty to deal with rivals when sharing is feasible
and a monopolist has developed a product that is so superior that it is ‘essential’ for rivals to
compete and cannot practicably be duplicated”). But see HOVENKAMP (1st ed. 1994), supra note
15, at 264–65 (concluding that “[r]eading Aspen to create a new obligation to deal where no
arrangement had existed before is a significant extension of its holding”).
162. See James A. Keyte, The Ripple Effects of Trinko: How It Is Affecting Section 2 Analysis,
20 ANTITRUST 44, 47 (2005) (reviewing post-Trinko decisions and noting that “[a]s these cases
reflect, Aspen has now effectively been limited to its facts”).
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conduct. But, because there are so few exceptions to the general noduty-to-deal rule (other than the exact facts of Aspen Skiing), it is
unclear how the plaintiff can show an antitrust injury.
The case of SureShot Golf Ventures, Inc. v. Topgolf International,
Inc., 163 a recent case out of the Fifth Circuit, illustrates this problem
well. Founded in 2000, Topgolf is the dominant virtual golf simulation
company in the United States. 164 In 2014, SureShot Golf Ventures
started as a competitor to Topgolf. 165 Topgolf had developed its own
proprietary ball-tracking technology, whereas SureShot licensed a balltracking software called Protracer from a third party. 166 SureShot sued
Topgolf after Topgolf acquired Protracer and refused to agree to
provide SureShot access to the software once its current five-year
license expired. 167 SureShot alleged that Topgolf acquired Protracer to
prevent SureShot from competing in the market, bringing
monopolization and attempted monopolization claims under the
Sherman Act as well as an unlawful acquisition claim under section 7
of the Clayton Act. 168
In its motion to dismiss, Topgolf attacked SureShot’s lawsuit on
several fronts. First, Topgolf argued that SureShot’s claim was unripe,
as it had not yet been denied access to Protracer. 169 Next, Topgolf cited
to Trinko for the proposition that it has no duty to deal with
SureShot. 170 And most critically, when specifically addressing the
unlawful acquisition claim, Topgolf argued that “[f]or the same core
reason that SureShot cannot plausibly allege anticompetitive effects
for its [s]ection 2 claims, it also cannot plausibly allege anticompetitive
effects for its [s]ection 7 and [s]ection 1 claims: Access to the Protracer
Range System is not necessary for competition.” 171
The district court dismissed the suit. 172 First, the court held that
SureShot lacked Article III standing because, given that Topgolf had
163. SureShot Golf Ventures, Inc. v. Topgolf Int’l, Inc., No. 17-20607, 2018 WL 4927554 (5th
Cir. Oct. 9, 2018) (per curiam), aff’g and modifying No. CV H-17-127, 2017 WL 3658948 (S.D.
Tex. Aug. 24, 2017).
164. Id. at *1.
165. Id.
166. Id. at *2.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support at 5, SureShot Golf Ventures, Inc.
v. Topgolf Int’l, Inc., 2017 WL 3658948 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2017) (No. 4:17-cv-127).
170. Id. at 8.
171. Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
172. SureShot Golf Ventures, Inc. v. Topgolf Int’l, Inc., No. CV H-17-127, 2017 WL 3658948,
at *6 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2017).
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not yet denied access to Protracer, SureShot’s injuries were wholly
speculative. 173 The court also held that SureShot lacked antitrust
standing on the theory that, had a different company—a third party—
acquired Protracer, SureShot would still have suffered the same
injury. 174 Finally, the court found that SureShot failed to plead that the
acquisition would “substantially lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly.” 175
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit,
agreeing that SureShot’s claim was unripe. 176 But, because it held that
there was no subject-matter jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit did not
address the question of whether SureShot had properly alleged an
antitrust injury. 177
The SureShot case exemplifies the failure of Cargill’s post-merger
inquiry. Both the district court and the court of appeals directed their
entire analysis toward one issue: whether there was a real threat that
the post-merger firm would do something anticompetitive. There was
no mention as to whether the merger, as its own unique event, was
damaging to competition. To be sure, this was a suit for damages, 178
and the Clayton Act’s language that a plaintiff be “injured in his
business or property” calls for greater concreteness. 179 But,
importantly, both courts’ Article III holdings focused on post-merger
conduct, suggesting that Cargill’s approach has also influenced how the
courts think about constitutional standing in antitrust cases. In other
words, it seems unlikely that SureShot would have had both Article III
and antitrust standing to seek an injunction prior to the acquisition,
even though the Clayton Act only requires a showing of “threatened
loss or damage.” 180
While perhaps justifiable under the Court’s constitutional
standing doctrines, such an outcome should be alarming for those who
think that the Clayton Act’s private right of action is not a dead letter.
If an antitrust plaintiff does not have standing to sue based on the
173. Id. at *4.
174. Id. at *5.
175. Id.
176. SureShot Golf Ventures, Inc. v. Topgolf Int’l, Inc., No. 17-20607, 2018 WL 4927554, at
*5 (5th Cir. Oct. 9, 2018).
177. Id. at *5 n.3 (“Because the case is not ripe, we find it unnecessary to analyze whether
SureShot alleged a cognizable antitrust injury as required for antitrust standing.”).
178. Plaintiff’s Original Complaint at 14, SureShot Golf Ventures, Inc. v. Topgolf Int’l, Inc.,
2017 WL 3658948 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2017) (No. 4:17-cv-127).
179. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 109–10 (1986) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 15).
180. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2018).
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allegations in SureShot—that, in response to the existence of a budding
competitive threat, a larger rival used its resources to purchase a
critical upstream component to deny the plaintiff access and force it
out of business—then the opportunities for private enforcement are,
indeed, slim. 181
A competitor could challenge a merger by alleging that the postmerger firm will facilitate collusion among rival firms that could
retaliate against the plaintiff for choosing not to collude. 182 This
remains a viable theory under section 1. But a plaintiff alleging injury
under a cartel retaliation theory faces its own challenges, including a
line of cases adopting the theory that competitors actually benefit from
higher degrees of market concentration and, therefore, do not suffer
injuries sufficient for standing. 183 Still, of the few private merger
lawsuits that are actually brought, most are brought by competitors,
and most rely on theories of single firm conduct. 184 Thus, the postCargill doctrinal narrowing of section 2 liability—which effectively
prohibits private-merger lawsuits by competitors—is concerning.
V. REMOVE THE CARGILL BARRIER TO ENFORCEMENT
The Court should overrule Cargill and reconsider the antitrust
injury doctrine for private merger lawsuits. In Cargill, the majority
failed to respond to Justice Stevens’ criticism of the majority’s focus on
the post-merger behavior. Up until consummation, a merger
represents the height of cooperative, or collusive, behavior. Horizontal
mergers are, at their core, decisions to completely agree on prices,
output, and market division, all of which are separately illegal under

181. Plaintiff’s Original Complaint at 4–11, SureShot Golf Ventures, Inc. v. Topgolf Int’l, Inc.,
2017 WL 3658948 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2017) (No. 4:17-cv-127).
182. See HOVENKAMP (5th ed. 2016), supra note 12, at 672 (describing requirements for a
“collusion-facilitating” challenge to a merger); see also Brodley, supra note 38, at 51–52
(describing the “cartel punishment” theory of competitor antitrust injury).
183. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 583 (1986)
(“[As defendants’] competitors, respondents stand to gain from any conspiracy to raise the
market price.”); Sprint Nextel Corp. v. AT&T Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d 308, 319–20 (D.D.C. 2011)
(denying standing because an increase in market concentration was presumed to benefit the
competitor-plaintiff).
184. See HOVENKAMP (5th ed. 2016), supra note 12, at 671 (“Nevertheless, in the relatively
small number of merger cases brought by private plaintiffs, the underlying rationale is most often
exclusionary practices such as predatory pricing.”).
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section 1 of the Sherman Act. 185 So why focus totally on the postmerger conduct?
If market concentration in the U.S. is reaching dangerous levels, 186
the goal should be to review the competitive merits of a given merger
and not be overly concerned with procedural technicalities. Having
identified the problem posed by the interaction of the antitrust injury
doctrine and section 2, it is time to begin thinking about a way forward.
A few possibilities are contemplated below.
One way to review the merits of more mergers is to resurrect
Justice Stevens’ dissent in Cargill. Recall that his approach asks the
reviewing court to do a first pass of the merger itself. 187 Under such an
approach, if there is a “reasonable probability” that competition will
be injured by the merger, then “there is a reasonable probability that a
competitor of the merging firms will suffer some corresponding harm
in due course.” 188 The specific harm resulting from the merger could be
conceptualized as the loss of the opportunity to compete with one’s
rivals in a competitive marketplace. Alternatively, if a merger causes a
rival firm to adjust its business operations to account for a new firm,
the concrete harm to the rival could be the change in operations that
the merger induced. In the context of vertical mergers, like in SureShot,
another option is to create an exception to the no-duty-to-deal rule for
circumstances in which the rival gained its anticompetitive advantage
through an illegal merger. Because it is axiomatic that possession of
monopoly power is permissible when gained “as a consequence of a
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident,” 189 then
monopoly power achieved or maintained through a competitiondestroying vertical merger falls outside of those categories and
warrants a specific exception to the general no-duty-to-deal rule.
In suggesting that the Court overturn a thirty-year-old precedent,
it is necessary to address the question of stare decisis. Although cases
should not be overruled simply because they were wrongly decided,
this case presents an ideal candidate for reconsideration. The
considerations for overruling prior decisions, according to Planned
185. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 (1990); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd.
of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273
U.S. 392, 398 (1927).
186. See supra notes 16–21 and accompanying text.
187. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 128–29 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
188. Id.
189. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004)
(quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966)).
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Parenthood v. Casey, 190 are: (1) whether there has been a dramatic
change in factual circumstances; (2) whether a development in “related
principles of law” necessitates a change; (3) whether the previous rule
has become unworkable; and (4) whether there has been widespread
reliance on the old rule, such that a change would cause “special
hardship.” 191
The factual realities of mergers and acquisitions have changed
since Cargill. 192 There is now an additional thirty years of empirical
evidence suggesting that mergers should be treated more skeptically.
The old Chicago School assumptions about efficiency returns have not
been borne out in the data. 193 In the past, a prevailing assumption
motivating skepticism of merger challenges was the fear of chilling
efficient integration. But empirical data indicates that those fears are
overblown. 194 Moreover, there is simply more market concentration in
the United States than there was 1986, and the FTC and DOJ have
more on their plates. 195 These factual realities support revisiting
Cargill.
Part III discussed the doctrinal narrowing of section 2, which is a
“related principle[] of law.” 196 It is unclear whether, in the wake of
Aspen Skiing, the Court in Cargill believed that section 2 jurisprudence
would take a different path. Perhaps not. But regardless, section 2 has
fundamentally changed in a way that has bearing on the Cargill
framework for antitrust injury. This change provides support for
revisiting the decision.
Whether the Cargill framework has become practically
unworkable depends on one’s view of the virtues of private lawsuits
challenging potentially anticompetitive mergers. For those who are

190. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
191. Id. at 854–55.
192. See supra notes 16–21 and accompanying text.
193. See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 406
(Basic Books 1978) (stating that antitrust law “should abandon its concern with such beneficial
practices as small horizontal mergers [and] all vertical and conglomerate mergers”). The Chicago
School generally redirected the focus of antitrust law towards economic welfare, and away from
concerns about size and protecting small businesses. In the context of mergers, the Chicago School
saw far too much concern with market concentration, fears about size, and protecting small firms,
and not enough concern with the economic welfare benefits that could accrue to consumers
through mergers. See Richard Schmalensee, Thoughts on the Chicago Legacy in U.S. Antitrust, in
CHICAGO SCHOOL, supra note 14, at 12–23 (giving an overview of the Chicago School’s influence
on antitrust law).
194. See supra notes 12–21 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
196. Casey, 505 U.S. at 855.
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distrustful of private attorneys general, there might not be a problem
with the status quo. That said, the Clayton Act explicitly provides for
private enforcement of the antitrust laws, including laws preventing
illegal acquisitions. 197 While the courts certainly can, and do, interpret
statutes in ways that balance a host of atextual concerns, they are
simply not authorized to read explicit provisions out of a statute’s
text. 198 Cargill’s focus on post-merger conduct has become practically
unworkable because it creates an insurmountable standard for a
private right of action that contemplates relief for “any” injured
person. 199
It is difficult to imagine how reversing Cargill would result in
exceptional hardship for any firm. Antitrust injury requirements are
procedural hurdles for private plaintiffs to get into court. So, to the
extent these rules influence firms’ primary conduct, they do so only as
part of the calculus in assessing litigation risk associated with pursuing
a merger. In this sense, traditional reliance interests are not implicated
because firms have not conformed their behavior around any
substantive rule. Moreover, if the new antitrust injury rule was to be
applied retroactively to mergers already consummated, the remedy for
any successful litigation would be damages. Courts are reluctant to
undo a merger after the fact. 200
Finally, stare decisis applies with less force in antitrust. 201 The
Court has been willing to overturn antitrust decisions even if they are
much older than Cargill in recognition that the economic assumptions
underlying the previous decisions no longer hold up. 202 Mergers should
be no different, and thus Cargill should be overruled.

197. See supra text accompanying note 38.
198. Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 136 S. Ct. 1938, 1949 (2016) (“[O]ur
constitutional structure does not permit this Court to rewrite the statute that Congress has
enacted.”) (internal quotations omitted).
199. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (2012).
200. See FTC v. Univ. Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1217 n.23 (11th Cir. 1991) (“[I]ndeed, once
an anticompetitive acquisition is consummated, it is difficult to ‘unscramble the egg.’”).
201. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007)
(describing how the Sherman Act is a common law statute and thus, stare decisis applies with less
force); Robert Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 38
(1966) (reviewing the legislative history of the Sherman Act and concluding that “[t]here can
hardly be any question that the discretion delegated to the courts by the Sherman Act was that of
determining the consumer interest in particular cases and assessing legality accordingly”).
202. See, e.g., PSKS, 551 U.S. at 900 (“Stare decisis, we conclude, does not compel our
continued adherence to the per se rule against vertical price restraints. As discussed earlier,
respected authorities in the economics literature suggest the per se rule is inappropriate, and there
is now widespread agreement that resale price maintenance can have procompetitive effects.”).
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CONCLUSION
Since 1914, mergers and acquisitions that substantially lessen
competition or “tend to create a monopoly” have been unlawful. In the
face of increased market concentration, market power, and concerning
evidence about the effects of mergers and acquisitions, it is time to find
and remove obstacles to effective enforcement of these merger laws.
One area that is ripe for reform is the antitrust injury doctrine for
merger lawsuits established by the Cargill decision, and, more
specifically, that decision’s interaction with section 2 of the Sherman
Act.
Instead of simply asking whether the merger itself is
anticompetitive, the Cargill decision asks a plaintiff to allege that the
post-merger firm will itself act anticompetitively in a way that injures
the plaintiff. To demonstrate this injury, plaintiffs must rely on
accepted theories of antitrust liability. And because the additional
theory of liability is aimed at the conduct of the new entity, plaintiffs
will often assert a theory of anticompetitive behavior under section 2.
However, in the time since Cargill was decided, the Court has
dramatically narrowed the scope of liability under section 2. This
narrowing has had the collateral effect of prohibiting competitorplaintiffs from being able to demonstrate an antitrust injury to
challenge a merger. In light of this doctrinal narrowing of section 2,
Cargill should be overruled.

